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NUCLEAR FACILITY LICENSING, 
TERRORIST THREATS, AND NEPA  
SECTION 102(2)(C) COMPLIANCE 
MICHAEL DEIULIS* 
Abstract: The conflicting decisions for the Courts of Appeals for the Third and 
Ninth Circuits in New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission, respectively, leave it an open question outside those juris-
dictions whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) must account for 
the environmental impacts of terrorism under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) § 102(2)(C). Courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach of 
requiring such an analysis because the impacts of terrorism are not too far re-
moved from the underlying agency action. Although programmatic treatment of 
the environmental effects of terrorism satisfies NEPA’s mandate, the NRC’s cur-
rent approach of implicitly accounting for terrorism within its “accident” analysis 
is insufficient. This Note argues that the NRC should supplement its Generic En-
vironmental Impact Statement with a section explicitly addressing the potential 
environmental impacts of terrorism. Accounting for a wider array of reasonably 
foreseeable impacts in this manner will ensure statutory compliance and promote 
environmental preservation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy pummeled the United States’s East 
Coast and forced the emergency shutdown of three nuclear reactors.1 Three 
more nuclear facilitates took the precaution of reducing their output while the 
nation’s oldest plant, the Oyster Creek facility in New Jersey, activated its 
backup cooling generators.2 While the nuclear industry was busy applauding 
itself for averting a disaster, some observers remained somewhat skeptical 
about the emergency preparedness of the country’s 104 nuclear reactors.3 This 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 Evan Osnos, Sandy, Fukushima, and the Nuclear Industry, NEW YORKER (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/11/sandy-fukushima-and-the-nuclear-industry.
html, available at http://perma.cc/U9EB-746U. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. 
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sense of caution was justified given the triple meltdown that occurred just 
months earlier at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.4 Aside from 
Fukushima’s well-documented human health effects, massive amounts of radi-
oactivity were released into the atmosphere, soil, and groundwater.5 The con-
sequences of a core meltdown can be catastrophic, regardless of whether pre-
cipitated by a hurricane or an earthquake and tsunami, as was the case in Ja-
pan.6 Although natural disasters such as Hurricane Sandy cause many Ameri-
cans to fear a domestic-Fukushima, a different kind of nuclear threat lurks in 
the shadows, one less-discussed but no less plausible.7 
President George W. Bush revealed in his January 2002 State of the Un-
ion address that U.S. forces “found diagrams of American nuclear power 
plants” among al-Qaeda materials hidden in Afghani caves.8 Additionally, al-
Qaeda training manuals, allegedly identifying nuclear facilities as primary tar-
gets for terrorist strikes, were also recovered.9 The Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) consequently issued an advisory to all the facilities and warned 
them of the possibility of an aerial terrorist attack.10 Eight state governors per-
ceived the threat as credible enough to warrant calling in the National Guard to 
protect their states’ nuclear plants.11 Within this post-9/11 context of height-
ened vigilance, states, organizations, and citizens all began exerting pressure 
on the NRC to account for the environmental impacts of terrorism as part of its 
facility licensing process.12 The NRC, however, has generally declined to con-
sider such impacts unless judicially compelled to do so.13 
In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit required the NRC 
to account for the environmental impacts of terrorism pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act’s (NEPA) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. 
 5 Alex Rosen, Effects of the Fukushima Nuclear Meltdowns on Environment and Health 1–9 (Mar. 
9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with University Clinic Dusseldorf, Department of General 
Pediatrics), available at http://www.fukushima-disaster.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/english/ippnw_
health-effects_fukushima.pdf and http://perma.cc/426B-2TBL. 
 6 See id. at 1–5. 
 7 See infra note 123 and accompanying text; Osnos, supra note 1. 
 8 Amanda Lopez, Note, NEPA in the Post 9/11 World, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 423, 424 (2010); Tar-
gets for Terrorism: Nuclear Facilities, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 2006), http://www.cfr.org/
homeland-security/targets-terrorism-nuclear-facilities/p10213, available at http://perma.cc/M3BQ-7F2Y. 
 9 Lopez, supra note 8, at 424; Targets for Terrorism: Nuclear Facilities, supra note 8. 
 10 Targets for Terrorism: Nuclear Facilities, supra note 8. 
 11 See id. 
 12 Alexander T. Briggs, Managing the Line Between Nuclear Power and Nuclear Terror: Consid-
ering the Threat of Terrorism as an Environmental Impact, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 223, 225 
(2011). 
 13 Id.; see infra notes 124, 127 and accompanying text. 
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provision.14 Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
found that such impacts are too attenuated and therefore need not be accounted 
for.15 Given the circuit split, it remains an open question outside those jurisdic-
tions whether the NRC must account for terrorism during EIS preparation.16 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the NEPA process and its ap-
plicability to federal agencies, focusing particularly on the NRC.17 Part II ad-
dresses the relevant background case law leading up to the circuit split, upon 
which the Ninth and Third Circuits relied in reaching their decisions.18 Part III 
provides a detailed analysis of the decisions involved in the circuit split.19 Fi-
nally, Part IV argues, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit, that the NRC 
should account for the environmental impacts of terrorism when licensing nu-
clear facilities.20 This part also considers the NRC’s programmatic approach to 
EIS preparation and notes the inadequacy of its current treatment of terrorism 
within the Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS).21 
I. STATUTORY OVERVIEW: AN INTRODUCTION TO NEPA 
President Nixon signed NEPA, commonly referred to as the Magna Carta 
of environmental law, into law in early 1970.22 NEPA was the first and perhaps 
most influential of several major environmental laws enacted in response to the 
heightened public consciousness of environmental degradation in the 1950s 
and 1960s.23 NEPA’s drafters had a bold vision for the future of environmental 
law predicated on an array of fundamental values ranging from the ethical to 
the aesthetic.24 NEPA’s idealism is readily apparent in its manifesto-like pur-
pose statement— “[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage produc-
tive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment . . . eliminate 
                                                                                                                           
 14 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 15 See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 144 (3rd Cir. 
2009); infra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
 16 See Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1035; New Jersey, 561 F.3d at 144; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (denying certiorari). 
 17 See infra notes 22–95 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 96–112 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 113–168 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 169–265 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 169–265 and accompanying text. 
 22 LINDA LUTHER, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND IMPLE-
MENTATION 1–2 (2005), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Unit1_01CRSReport.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/92LZ-RCQC. 
 23 Id. at 1–3; see DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (2d ed. 2012). 
 24 See ENVTL. L. INST., LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 10:53 (2012); Introduction, 
NAT’L ENVTL. POL’Y ACT, http://nepanet.wix.com/nepa_splash#!_page-2 (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
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damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare 
of man.”25 
NEPA aspires to rectify the inherent tension of an ever-evolving world, 
constrained by a finite supply of natural resources.26 The Act’s uniqueness lies 
within the purely procedural mechanisms for achieving its substantive goals.27 
Despite this procedural reliance, NEPA imposes few affirmative mandates.28 In 
its most simplistic sense, the Act is an environmental full disclosure di-
rective.29 NEPA compels the government to exercise forethought by account-
ing for the potential environmental impacts of proposed federal actions.30 The 
Act’s singular operational mandate thus calls for the formal preparation of a 
detailed EIS.31 
A. NEPA’s Core: The EIS 
All federal agencies are subject to NEPA’s environmental decision-
making obligations.32 Consequently, whenever a federal agency seeks to un-
dertake a major action that has a potential to “significantly affect the quality of 
the human environment,” it must first prepare an EIS.33 The EIS must include, 
inter alia, both a detailed description of the environmental consequences of the 
proposed action and a discussion of possible alternatives.34 In analyzing the 
EIS’s role within the broader context of the NEPA process as a whole, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that “‘the EIS is not an end in itself, but rather a tool to 
promote environmentally sensitive decisionmaking . . . [a]bove all, the EIS 
                                                                                                                           
 25 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
 26 Introduction, supra note 24. “Beneath the lofty rhetoric . . . it sought to balance environmental 
concerns with the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Amer-
icans.” Id. 
 27 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 24, § 10:53. According to Sen. Henry Jackson, the Act’s primary 
drafter, its principal importance derives from the fact that it “establishes new decision making proce-
dures for all agencies of the federal government.” Id. (quoting Henry M. Jackson, Environmental 
Quality, the Courts, and Congress, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1970)). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. § 10:53 n.2 (citing Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 
1972)). 
 30 See id. 
 31 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); see ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 24, § 10:53. 
 32 MANDELKER, supra note 23, § 1:3 (referencing Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. 
Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Courts have demonstrated a proclivity for interpreting the term “feder-
al action” broadly. MANDELKER, supra note 23, § 1:1. NEPA never actually uses the phrase “envi-
ronmental impact statement” but rather refers to a “detailed statement” discussing environmental 
impacts. ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 24, § 10:13. 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
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should be used to assess environmental impacts, not to justify decisions al-
ready made.’”35 
The process leading up to EIS preparation begins with the formal publica-
tion of a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register, which serves to inform 
the public of the agency’s intended action.36 The NOI also triggers the scoping 
process—a period of collaboration between the agency and public to define the 
relevant array of issues to be addressed in the EIS.37 The preparation process 
produces both an initial draft and a final EIS.38 The draft EIS must include a 
“Purpose and Need” statement that explains the rationale behind the proposed 
action.39 The draft is then subject to a forty-five day period of public review 
and comment.40 Following approval of the final EIS, the process culminates 
with the implementing agency’s publication of a “Record of Decision” that 
explains the final result, alternatives considered, and plans for mitigation of 
environmental damage.41 
While the EIS is NEPA’s defining feature and provides its primary source 
of efficacy, alternative means of assessment are available that have the capabil-
ity to obviate the need for an EIS.42 In fact, only a small minority of agency 
actions require EIS preparation.43 
1. Alternatives to EIS Preparation 
Before a federal agency adopts a course of action, it must first determine 
whether the action warrants EIS preparation.44 An agency prepares an envi-
ronmental assessment (EA) when the proposed action’s environmental impacts 
are uncertain.45 The EA is therefore a preliminary document—an abridged 
                                                                                                                           
 35 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 24, § 10:20 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.02(g) (2012)). 
 36 LUTHER, supra note 22, at 18. 
 37 Introduction, supra note 24. 
 38 LUTHER, supra note 22, at 18. 
 39 Introduction, supra note 24. 
 40 Id. 
 41 LUTHER, supra note 22, at 20; Introduction, supra note 24. 
 42 See ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 24, § 10:9; LUTHER, supra note 22, at 17. 
 43 LUTHER, supra note 22, at 17–18. For example, the Department of Transportation’s Federal 
Highway Administration reported that only about three percent of all highway projects in 2001 re-
quired preparation of an EIS. Id. 
 44 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 24, § 10:10. NEPA provides “categorical exclusions” for certain 
classifications of agency actions that, individually or cumulatively, do not significantly impact the 
quality of the human environment. Introduction, supra note 24. The decision to opt for a categorical 
exclusion is typically based on an agency’s prior experience with that type of action, which has previ-
ously been determined to have only minor effects. Id. Such categories of actions obviate the need to 
prepare an EIS and permit the agency to proceed with the proposed action. ENVTL. L. INST., supra 
note 24, § 10:10. 
 45 LUTHER, supra note 22, at 17. 
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EIS—that explores and clarifies uncertainties surrounding the proposed action 
to determine the necessity of EIS preparation.46 If at any time during EA prep-
aration or analysis, the agency determines the proposed action’s environmental 
impacts to be significant, EIS preparation should commence.47 Conversely, a 
determination of insignificant or nonexistent impacts triggers a finding of no 
significant impact (FONSI), which enables the action to proceed unimpeded.48 
Completion of an EA is not a prerequisite for EIS preparation.49 Agencies are 
permitted to, and often should, jump right to EIS preparation if prior experi-
ence and common sense dictate that the proposed action will have a significant 
environmental impact.50 
2. The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
There are inherent difficulties in examining the cumulative effects of re-
lated agency actions on an individual basis.51 The Programmatic Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (PEIS) was specifically developed to overcome this prob-
lem.52 The programmatic approach considers groups of related actions togeth-
er, or comprehensively reviews the impacts of an agency-wide program before 
it produces actions that will necessitate individual examination.53 
The Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ)54 regulations expressly 
encourage agencies to “tier” their EISs.55 Tiering involves separating general 
issues, broad in scope and applicability, from issues unique to a certain site, 
location, or action.56 The former are addressed in a broad, programmatic 
statement that is generic in nature, while the latter are reserved for a narrow, 
often site-specific, analysis.57 This approach eliminates repetitive discussion of 
issues and enables the agency to focus its analysis on site-specific issues that 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See id. at 20. The three primary functions served by the EA are (1) providing evidence and 
analysis for determining the necessity of an EIS, (2) aiding agency compliance with NEPA in the 
absence of an EIS, and (3) facilitating preparation of an EIS under applicable circumstances. Id. 
 47 Id. at 21. 
 48 See id. 
 49 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 24, § 10:10. 
 50 Id. 
 51 MANDELKER, supra note 23, § 9:2. 
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. An example of such interrelated actions might be the proposed construction of a group of 
individual highways that make up a regional highway network. Id. 
 54 The CEQ is a NEPA-created federal agency that is principally responsible for administering the 
Act through the adoption of interpretive regulations. Id. § 2:8. 
 55 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2012). 
 56 Id. § 1508.28. 
 57 Id. 
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warrant a heightened degree of attention.58 The regulations state that the site-
specific EIS need only summarize those elements already addressed in a broad 
PEIS and should concentrate on issues unique to the site-specific action.59 
Consequently, many federal agencies—with varying degrees of success—have 
begun to adopt PEISs to increase administrative efficiency, facilitate agency 
planning, and provide analytical foundations for subsequent project-specific 
actions.60 
Determining whether a PEIS is appropriate for a certain type of agency 
action requires an evaluation of the project’s nature and its nexus to potential 
environmental impacts.61 Use of a PEIS is typically appropriate when proposed 
actions are linked geographically or generically—by timing, environmental 
impacts, alternatives, implementation methods, or subject matter.62 The appli-
cation of a PEIS is therefore not restricted solely to those actions derived from 
formally recognized agency policies.63 
Since PEISs are essentially a subspecies of the EIS, the preparation pro-
cess is largely the same.64 NEPA’s vague treatment of the PEIS has caused var-
ious agencies to develop their own unique approaches to programmatic analy-
sis.65 Although programmatic NEPA analyses have been declared “valuable 
decisionmaking tools,” the judiciary has nevertheless been hesitant to embrace 
them willingly.66 
B. Application to Federal Agencies: The NRC 
Although the CEQ administers NEPA, the actual power conferred to that 
agency is merely advisory.67 The CEQ’s confinement to an advisory role high-
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. §§ 1508.28, 1502.20. 
 59 Id. § 1502.20. 
 60 See Beth C. Bryant, NEPA Compliance in Fisheries Management: The Programmatic Supple-
mental Environmental Impact Statement on Alaskan Groundfish Fisheries and Implications for NEPA 
Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (2006). 
 61 Id. at 446. 
 62 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c) (2012). 
 63 See id. 
 64 Bryant, supra note 60, at 445. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 441; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW § 17:31 (2d ed. 2013); NEPA TASK FORCE, THE NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 35 (2003), available 
at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/library/2013/02/26/Pacific_NEPA%20final.pdf and http://perma.
cc/QFR4-RZYS. 
 67 MANDELKER, supra note 23, § 2:8. The CEQ’s responsibilities include environmental review, 
research, reporting, evaluation of federal activities for NEPA compliance, and preparation of annual 
environmental quality reports. Id. 
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lights the considerable discretion afforded to federal agencies in their efforts to 
apply and interpret NEPA.68 In fact, individual federal agencies have nearly 
unmitigated authority to decide how best to apply the CEQ’s regulations.69 
One such agency, the NRC, formerly the Atomic Energy Commission, is 
the primary federal agency responsible for regulating radioactive materials 
under the Atomic Energy Act.70 More specifically, the NRC controls the na-
tion’s use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear material by means of a 
five-part regulatory process involving guidance, licensing, oversight, opera-
tional experience, and decisional support.71 One of the NRC’s primary respon-
sibilities is the licensing of commercial nuclear power plants.72 Both the issu-
ance of new licenses and the relicensing of existing facilities qualify under 
NEPA as major federal actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”73 The NRC must therefore consider the potential environmental 
impacts of such actions as part of its decision-making process.74 
1. The NRC’s Programmatic Approach to NEPA Compliance: The GEIS 
and SEIS 
The NRC’s approach to EIS preparation depends on the nature and scope 
of the proposed action.75 NRC regulations provide that licenses issued to new-
ly constructed facilitates must be accompanied by site-specific EISs.76 On the 
other hand, the NRC takes a programmatic approach to analyzing the potential 
environmental impacts associated with the relicensing of existing facilities.77 
The agency further divides and categorizes the environmental impacts of li-
cense renewal into generic and site-specific issues.78 All issues that are general 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See id. 
 69 Id. This authority is subject to judicial review only in the event that an agency’s particular 
method of implementation is challenged, despite the fact that NEPA lacks a provision explicitly 
providing for judicial review. Id. § 1:1. 
 70 ALI ABAZARI & JACOB ARECHIGA, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 18:2 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 71 How We Regulate, NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory.html 
(last updated Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/VV5V-TSE8. 
 72 Id. The NRC’s licensing activities involve the issuance of new licenses, renewals, amendments, 
and transfers. Id. 
 73 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (2012). 
 74 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
 75 See Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Li-
cense Renewal of Nuclear Plants: Main Report, NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N (May 1996), http://www.
nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1437/v1/, available at http://perma.cc/T2F5-JSTF. 
 76 See 10 C.F.R. § 51.75(a). 
 77 Id. § 51.95(c). 
 78 New Jersey, 561 F.3d at 134; 68 Fed. Reg. 33,209, 33,209–10 (June 3, 2003). 
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in nature and likely to be common to multiple facilities are addressed in a 
GEIS.79 This approach enables the NRC to perform a systematic inquiry that 
avoids repetitive discussion and analysis of common impacts that are already 
well-documented facility-wide.80 
To create its GEIS, the NRC analyzed the significant environmental im-
pacts of ninety-two different issues.81 The agency determined that sixty-nine 
were applicable to all plants and thus amenable to generic treatment.82 The 
remaining issues require site-specific analysis in a Supplemental Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (SEIS) for each individual facility.83 
The NRC has classified the generic issues common to all nuclear plants as 
“Category 1” issues and those necessitating site-specific SEIS evaluation as 
“Category 2” issues.84 Broadly classified Category 1 issues include the impacts 
of refurbishment, operation, uranium fuel cycle, management of waste, de-
commissioning, and most notably for purposes of this Note, accidents.85 The 
NRC uses the term “accident” to account for “any unintentional event outside 
the normal plant operational envelope that results in a release or the potential 
for release of radioactive materials into the environment.”86 Two basic kinds of 
accidents are accounted for: design-based accidents and severe accidents.87 
Design-based accidents are those that pertain to the design and perfor-
mance standards of a given facility.88 Before being issued a license, all plants 
must demonstrate an ability to accommodate and safeguard against design-
based accidents.89 Severe accidents are described as those involving multiple 
failures of equipment or function.90 This category of accident has a lower 
probability of occurrence than design-based accidents, but higher potential 
consequences.91 The NRC’s relicensing GEIS states that externally initiated 
severe accidents from causes such as “tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, fires, 
and sabotage have not traditionally been discussed in quantitative terms.”92 
The NRC has occasionally performed detailed probabilistic analyses of exter-
                                                                                                                           
 79 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, supra note 75 (abstract). 
 80 Id. § 1.1. 
 81 68 Fed. Reg. at 33209–10. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, supra note 75 (executive summary). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. § 5.2. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Id. § 5.3.2. 
 90 Id. § 5.2. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. § 5.3.3.1. 
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nal events or phenomenon, but these evaluations notably excluded sabotage 
from consideration.93 The GEIS explains that the risks from sabotage are not 
accounted for because they are so nebulous as to escape quantifiable assess-
ment.94 Despite an inability to calculate the threat of sabotage accurately, the 
NRC opines that the risk is small and sufficiently addressed by generic consid-
eration of internally initiated accidents.95 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Litigation related to the National Environmental Policy Act often requires 
determining whether § 102(2)(C) of the Act compels consideration of a given 
environmental impact.96 As is often the case with statutory interpretation, this 
exercise is not always cut and dry.97 Courts have advanced several different 
tests or analytical frameworks for delineating between those environmental 
effects that necessitate consideration and those that do not.98 Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality regulations meanwhile expressly require consideration of 
“reasonably foreseeable” impacts.99 
In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,100 the Su-
preme Court effectively limited the scope of NEPA-mandated analysis by ex-
empting psychological effects from obligatory NEPA § 102(2)(C) considera-
tion.101 The Court found that “NEPA does not require [an] agency to assess 
every impact or effect of its proposed action, but only the impact or effect on 
the environment.”102 The Court instructed that determining whether a particular 
effect warrants consideration requires an inquiry into its relationship with the 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 766–67 (1983). 
 97 See Ellen P. April, Theories of Statutory Interpretation and (Their Limits), 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1899, 1899–900 (2005). 
 98 See infra notes 108, 119 and accompanying text. 
 99 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2012). Reasonable foreseeability “includes impacts which have cata-
strophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided the analysis of the 
impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the 
rule of reason.” Id. § 1502.22(b)(4). 
 100 460 U.S. at 766. 
 101 Id. at 779. Metropolitan Edison (“Metropolitan”) was the owner of two nuclear power plants, 
TMI-1 and TMI-2, located at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Id. at 768. After a 
serious accident that damaged TMI-2’s reactor, the NRC ordered Metropolitan to keep TMI-1 inop-
erative pending a determination that it could be operated safely. Id. at 768–69. People Against Nuclear 
Energy, an association of concerned residents, contended that resuming operation of TMI-1 would be 
psychologically damaging to residents in the plant’s vicinity. Id. at 769. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review whether NEPA requires examination of such effects. Id. at 771. 
 102 Id. at 772 (emphasis added). 
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change in the physical environment.103 The requisite relationship identified by 
the Court was that of a “reasonably close causal relationship.”104 
With respect to the facility at issue, the Court ultimately found that the 
risk of another accident does not constitute an effect on the physical environ-
ment.105 The Court, therefore, found no reasonably close causal relationship 
and held that the NRC need not evaluate the physiological effects of risk at-
tendant to the facility’s resumed operation.106 
In No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge,107 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assessed the adequacy of the Air Force’s Envi-
ronmental Assessment (EA) for the installation of numerous radio towers that 
were to become part of the Ground Wave Emergency Network (“GWEN”)—a 
radio communication system resistant to the effects of nuclear war.108 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s application of Metropolitan 
Edison because that case dealt with a different kind of causation.109 Instead, the 
court articulated a different standard whereby “an impact statement need not 
discuss remote and highly speculative consequences.”110 The Ninth Circuit 
went on to find the casual connection between GWEN’s construction and the 
advent of nuclear war to be too attenuated to require discussion in an EIS.111 In 
doing so, the court found the Alliance’s contention that GWEN would increase 
the likelihood of nuclear war to be merely speculative.112 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In the atmosphere of heightened alarm and vigilance that followed the 
September 11th attacks, many government officials feared that similar attacks 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. at 773. 
 104 Id. at 774. The Court explicated that this relationship approximates the tort concept of proxi-
mate causation and noted that some changes in the physical environment are merely “but for” causes 
that may not require consideration under NEPA § 102(2)(C) because the “causal chain is too attenuat-
ed.” Id. 
 105 Id. at 775. The Court reasoned that the fear experienced by local residents lengthens the causal 
chain—beginning with renewed operation of TMI-1 and ending with psychological health damage—
beyond NEPA’s scope. Id. 
 106 Id. at 779. 
 107 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 108 See id. at 1381. The No GWEN Alliance (“Alliance”) challenged the Air Force’s EA and 
subsequent issuance of a Finding of No Significant Impact. Id. The Alliance argued that the Air Force 
should have prepared an Environmental Impact Statement that considered the environmental impacts 
of nuclear war. Id. It claimed that the GWEN system was inherently destabilizing and would actually 
make nuclear war more probable. Id. 
 109 Id. at 1385. 
 110 Id. at 1385–86 (citing Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 111 Id. at 1386. 
 112 Id. 
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might be launched against the nation’s nuclear power plants.113 Recognizing 
that nuclear facilities are both attractive and vulnerable targets for attack, many 
began to push the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to take acts of ter-
rorism into consideration as part of the environmental review process for a fa-
cility’s licensing or relicensing.114 The NRC, however, has long maintained 
that it need not address the potential impacts of terrorism in an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) and has thus routinely declined to do so.115 Recently, 
federal courts have produced divergent results in lawsuits petitioning them to 
compel National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) consideration of terror-
ism.116 In San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion,117 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the NRC must 
account for the environmental impacts of acts of terrorism.118 Conversely, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declared in New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission119 that 
such impacts do not require evaluation because they exceed the scope of 
NEPA’s mandate.120 
A. The Ninth Circuit: Mothers For Peace 
In December 2001, Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) filed an ap-
plication with the NRC for a license to build and operate an interim spent fuel 
storage installation at PG&E’s Diablo Canyon Power Plant in San Luis Obispo, 
California.121 In response the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, a local non-
profit organization, alleged, inter alia, that the NRC impermissibly neglected to 
address the potential environmental impacts of terrorist attacks on the facility.122 
The NRC rejected this contention and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact 
in its subsequent Environmental Assessment (EA), claiming, “an NRC environ-
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Michael S. Munson, Averting Nuclear 9/11: The Need to Move Beyond NEPA and Transi-
tion to a Homeland Security-Administered Infrastructure Security Statement, 35 WM. & MARY EN-
VTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 335, 347 (2010). 
 114 Briggs, supra note 12, at 225. 
 115 See N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 135 (3rd Cir. 
2009); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th 
Cir. 2006); In re Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 357 (2002). 
 116 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1035; New Jersey, 561 F.3d at 144. 
 117 449 F.3d at 1016. 
 118 Id. at 1035. 
 119 561 F.3d at 132. 
 120 Id. at 143–44. 
 121 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1019–21. 
 122 Id. at 1021–22. 
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mental review is not the appropriate forum for the consideration of terrorist at-
tacks.”123 
The NRC’s position that NEPA does not require consideration of the envi-
ronmental effects of terrorist attacks is primarily based upon the reasoning 
from In re Private Fuel Storage.124 In accordance with the arguments from that 
case, the NRC reasserted that (1) the possibility of a terrorist attack is too far 
removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action; (2) be-
cause the risk of terrorist attack is indeterminate, the analysis is likely to be 
meaningless; (3) NEPA does not require a “worst case” scenario analysis; and 
(4) NEPA’s public process is not an appropriate forum for sensitive security 
issues.125 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the NRC’s findings for reasonableness 
and concluded that each of the four proffered grounds, “either individually or 
collectively, [did] not support the NRC’s categorical refusal to consider the 
environmental effects of a terrorist attack.”126 
1. The Ninth Circuit Rejects Applicability of the Metropolitan Edison Test 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with the NRC’s first ground for re-
fusal and inquired whether the proposed agency action had the potential to sig-
nificantly affect the quality of the human environment.127 The NRC had argued 
that the appropriate framework for examination was the proximate cause anal-
ysis in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy.128 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, found the Metropolitan Edison test to be inapplica-
ble.129 The court claimed that Metropolitan Edison was distinguishable be-
cause it dealt with the potential risk of psychological damage to individuals in 
the vicinity of a nuclear plant upon the facility’s reopening.130 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held instead that No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge pro-
vided the appropriate framework for analysis.131 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Id. at 1024. 
 124 Id. at 1022; Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 340–50. 
 125 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1022; Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 340–50. 
 126 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1028. 
 127 Id. at 1029. 
 128 Id. Accordingly, the NRC claimed that the nexus between the licensing of a nuclear facility 
and the environmental impacts of a terrorist attack exceeds the scope of a reasonably close causal 
relationship. Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s Endorsement of the No GWEN Approach 
In No GWEN, the Ninth Circuit held the nexus between construction of an 
emergency network system and nuclear war to be too attenuated to require dis-
cussion of the potential environmental impacts.132 In Mothers for Peace the 
court explained that Metropolitan Edison, No GWEN, and the case at bar all 
dealt with a series of three events—(1) a major federal action; (2) a change in 
the physical environment; and (3) an effect.133 Although Metropolitan Edison 
was concerned with the relationship between events two and three, No GWEN 
and the case at bar were concerned with the link between events one and 
two.134 The appropriate inquiry in Mothers for Peace was therefore whether 
terrorist attacks are so “remote and highly speculative” as to go beyond the 
limits of NEPA’s required analysis.135 The court concluded that this possibility 
was not too remote and highly speculative because the presence of the new 
storage installation would present an attractive target and increase the probabil-
ity of an attack on the facility.136 
3. Rejection of the NRC’s Additional Grounds for Refusal 
The NRC argued that it did not need to address the environmental impacts 
of acts of terrorism because the risk of a terrorist attack could not be adequate-
ly determined.137 The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected this argument on the basis 
that NEPA does not require the establishment of a precise numeric probability 
of risk.138 Moreover, the court found no authority to support the NRC’s implic-
it conclusion that it could dismiss potential environmental impacts simply by 
characterizing them as “unquantifiable.”139 
The court rejected the NRC’s third ground for refusal—that the agency is 
not required to conduct a “worst-case” analysis—as misguided.140 The Ninth 
Circuit contended that the NRC wrongly considered the plaintiff’s request for a 
discussion of the potential environmental impacts of a terrorist attack as tanta-
                                                                                                                           
 132 No GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1386; Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1029. 
 133 See Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 771–72; Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1029; No 
GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1384–85. 
 134 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1029–30. 
 135 Id. at 1030. 
 136 Id. The court additionally found that the NRC’s own post 9/11 efforts to undertake a “top to 
bottom” security review against threats of terrorism contradicted its subsequent argument that the 
possibility of attack was remote and highly speculative. Id. at 1030–31. 
 137 Id. at 1031. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 1032. In fact, there is case law to the contrary. Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 719 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
 140 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1032–33. 
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mount to a “worst-case” analysis.141 According to the court, the possibility of 
terrorist attack is not a “worst-case” scenario merely by virtue of the low or 
indeterminate likelihood of its occurrence.142 
The Ninth Circuit proved unreceptive to the NRC’s final argument that 
compliance with the plaintiff’s request was unreasonable given associated se-
curity concerns.143 In admonishing this argument, the court pointed to the lack 
of case law supporting the defendant’s position that security concerns exempt 
an agency from NEPA’s § 102(2)(C) requirements.144 
B. The Third Circuit: New Jersey 
In New Jersey—three years after the Ninth Circuit decided Mothers for 
Peace—the Third Circuit addressed the same fundamental issue of whether the 
NRC must account for acts of terrorism as part of its facility licensing pro-
cess.145 Unmoved by the persuasive authority of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
the Third Circuit reached a divergent result and created a circuit split.146 
In 2005, the AmerGen Energy Company applied to the NRC for renewal 
of its operating license for the Oyster Creek facility located in Ocean Town-
ship, New Jersey (“Oyster Creek”).147 The New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP) subsequently challenged the NRC’s failure to 
prepare an EIS addressing the potential impacts of an airborne terrorist attack 
on Oyster Creek.148 
The NRC’s position was that terrorism is a security issue bearing no rela-
tionship to the ageing of the facility and was thus inappropriate for considera-
tion in a relicensing review.149 The NRC additionally found that NEPA impos-
es no duty to consider such intentionally malevolent acts because they are 
“‘too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency ac-
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. at 1033. 
 142 Id. at 1033–34. 
 143 Id. at 1034. 
 144 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); see Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1034. “There is no ‘na-
tional defense’ exemption to NEPA . . . . [T]his mandate includes weighing the environmental costs of 
the [project] even though the project has serious security implications.” Id. (quoting No GWEN, 855 
F.2d at 1038). Additionally, refraining from publicizing certain information, even on the basis of secu-
rity concerns, was found to impede satisfaction of NEPA’s public participation function. Id. at 1034–
35. 
 145 See New Jersey, 561 F.3d at 133; Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1019. 
 146 See New Jersey, 561 F.3d at 144. 
 147 Id. at 135. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. 
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tion.’”150 Also, such analysis would be redundant given previous efforts and 
reviews.151 
The NJDEP was unsatisfied with these findings and filed a petition for 
judicial review of the NRC’s order.152 The NJDEP’s primary argument was that 
the NRC has a duty to protect against foreseeable harm, irrespective of the fact 
that the source of that harm is an intentional criminal act.153 The NJDEP cited 
both the September 11th attacks and the NRC’s own efforts to improve securi-
ty at nuclear facilities as evidence of the foreseeability of environmental harm 
precipitated by terrorist attacks.154 Despite the NJDEP’s claim that Metropoli-
tan Edison was inapplicable to the current case, the Third Circuit found other-
wise.155 
1. The Third Circuit’s Application of Metropolitan Edison 
According to the Third Circuit, Metropolitan Edison drew a manageable 
line distinguishing the causal changes that make an agency responsible for an 
effect from those that do not.156 The court noted that the NRC, in Metropolitan 
Edison, could control the nuclear facility’s function and operation, but not how 
citizens perceived the risks of another accident.157 Analogously, in the case at 
bar, the agency could control whether the Oyster Creek facility’s equipment 
was suitable for continued operation, but not the safety of the airspace above 
the facility.158 The court reasoned that because a terrorist attack requires inter-
vening acts of independent significance, the chain of causal inferences is too 
attenuated and thus exceeds the requisite reasonably close causal relation-
ship.159 
The Third Circuit distinguished Mothers for Peace on the grounds that the 
proposed agency action in that case involved the construction of a new facility, 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Id. (quoting In re Amergen Energy, Co., 65 N.R.C. 124, 129 (2007)). 
 151 Id. at 135–36. The NRC noted that (1) it had already undertaken significant efforts to increase 
security at nuclear facilities, (2) the previously prepared Generic Environmental Impact Statement 
determined that the effects of a terrorist attack would be no worse than the damage resulting from 
internally initiated events, and (3) the NRC already performed a site-specific “severe accident mitiga-
tion alternatives” analysis in its Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the facility. Id. 
 152 Id. at 136. 
 153 Id. at 137. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 139. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 140. The acts of independent significance are third-party criminal acts and the failure of 
government agencies responsible for preventing terrorism. Id. 
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as opposed to a relicensing as in the case at bar.160 In the court’s estimation, the 
construction of a new facility constitutes a change to the physical environment 
with an arguably closer causal relationship to a potential terrorist attack than 
the relicensing of an existing facility.161 The Third Circuit additionally noted in 
support of its departure from the Ninth Circuit that no other circuit had inter-
preted NEPA so as to require an analysis of the environmental impacts of hy-
pothetical acts of terrorism.162 
2. Argument Against Requiring Redundant and Superfluous Analysis 
Additionally, the Third Circuit found that even if NEPA did require a dis-
cussion of the environmental impacts of terrorism on Oyster Creek, the NRC 
already addressed these concerns through other channels.163 First, the court 
determined that the NRC’s Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) 
had previously discussed the risks associated with a terrorist attack and deter-
mined them to be impossible to quantify, but nevertheless quite small.164 The 
court agreed that these findings were generic and therefore exempt from fur-
ther discussion in a license renewal EIS.165 
According to the Third Circuit, when the NRC’s GEIS was considered in 
conjunction with its Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS)—
which analyzed alternatives to mitigate serious accidents at Oyster Creek—the 
result was a comprehensive analysis of the potential environmental impacts of 
terrorism at Oyster Creek.166 Because the NJDEP failed to offer any evidence 
of an alternative, or more suitable means of analysis, it failed to satisfy its bur-
den of demonstrating that the NRC could have evaluated more meaningful 
risks.167 
In the end, the court agreed with the NRC’s position that relicensing the 
Oyster Creek facility did not bear a reasonably close causal relationship to the 
potential environmental impacts precipitated by terrorist attacks.168 
                                                                                                                           
 160 Id. at 142. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 142–43. 
 163 See id. at 143. 
 164 Id. The Third Circuit also pointed out that the GEIS states that the effects would be no worse 
than those resulting from internally initiated events. Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See id. at 144. 
 167 Id. 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE NRC’S NEPA COMPLIANCE 
Given the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant certiorari and resolve the incon-
gruities between the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, whether the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC) is obligated to account for the environmental impacts 
of terrorism remains an open question outside those jurisdictions.169 For the time 
being, the absence of binding authority leaves the lower federal courts with dis-
cretion to resolve this issue jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction.170 Inter-circuit conflict in 
this context has the undesirable effect of imposing different sets of rules on nu-
clear facilities, merely as a result of geographic happenstance.171 If the NRC 
continues to decline to incorporate the impacts of terrorism within its National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) § 102(2)(C) analysis, courts outside the Ninth 
and Third Circuits should follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit and compel such 
an analysis.172 Persuasive legal and policy grounds exist for supporting this con-
clusion, which promotes environmental preservation by requiring informed deci-
sion-making.173 
Additionally, the NRC’s current position that its discussion of “accident” 
scenarios, within the Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS), implic-
itly accounts for terrorist acts is inadequate.174 The NRC should therefore 
amend or supplement its current GEIS to explicitly account for the potential 
environmental impacts of terrorism.175 
A. The NRC Should Account for Terrorism 
The NRC’s long-maintained justification for not accounting for the im-
pacts of terrorism is four-fold.176 The NRC argues that (1) the possibility of a 
terrorist attack is too far removed from the natural or expected consequences 
of agency action; (2) because the risk of a terrorist attack is indeterminate, the 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace, 549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (deny-
ing certiorari). 
 170 See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth 
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1138–39. “On questions not yet squarely resolved by the Su-
preme Court, the nation’s twelve general jurisdiction federal courts of appeals decide as they see fit.” 
Id. at 1139. 
 171 See id. at 1151. 
 172 N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 143–44 (3rd Cir. 
2009); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th 
Cir. 2006); see In re Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340, 357 (2002). 
 173 See infra notes 198–255 and accompanying text; ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 27, § 10:53 n.2. 
 174 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
 175 See infra notes 169–265 and accompanying text. 
 176 See Private Fuel Storage, 56 N.R.C. at 357. 
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analysis is likely to be meaningless; (3) NEPA does not require a “worst case” 
scenario analysis; and (4) NEPA’s public process is not an appropriate forum 
for sensitive security issues.177 The dubious reasoning supporting each of these 
grounds for refusal warrants critical analysis.178 
1. The Possibility of a Terrorist Attack Is Not Too Far Removed Under the 
No GWEN Framework 
Under the test from No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge, 
“remote and highly speculative” environmental effects do not require consid-
eration in Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) preparation.179 The Ninth 
Circuit was correct in applying this test in San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission because the agency action in No GWEN 
was analytically analogous to a nuclear facility licensing.180 Minor factual dif-
ferences notwithstanding, both cases examine the causal link between a federal 
action and the environmental impacts of an attack.181 The plaintiffs in No 
GWEN argued that the mere presence of the Ground Wave Emergency Net-
work (“GWEN”) system would provoke attack and make nuclear war more 
probable.182 The petitioners in Mothers for Peace similarly claimed that the 
construction of the Diablo Canyon storage installation would increase the like-
lihood that terrorists would target the facility.183 Thus, it was reasonable for the 
Ninth Circuit to adopt the No GWEN test to determine whether the nexus be-
tween terrorism and construction of a nuclear facility was too “remote and 
highly speculative,” in the same way that the nexus between construction of 
the GWEN towers and nuclear war was.184 
The No GWEN test has the added advantage of inclusiveness.185 The ex-
pansive range of impacts that fall within the ambit of this test is consistent with 
the NEPA’s intentionally broad scope.186 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Id.; see also Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1028. 
 178 See infra notes 198–255 and accompanying text. 
 179 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1029–30; No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Al-
dridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 180 See No GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1381; Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1029–30; New Jersey, 561 
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 182 No GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1381–82. 
 183 See Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030. 
 184 See id. at 1029; No GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1381–82. 
 185 Ben Schifman, The Limits of NEPA: Consideration of the Impacts of Terrorism in Environ-
mental Impact Statements for Nuclear Facilitates, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 373, 396–97 (2010). Con-
versely, application of the proximate cause test from Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nu-
clear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), is more restrictive and thus excludes too many potential impacts. 
Schifman, supra, at 396. 
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Whereas the Ninth Circuit properly applied the No GWEN test, the Third 
Circuit erred in invoking the “reasonably close causal relationship” standard 
from Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy.187 Metropoli-
tan Edison is inapplicable to cases like Mothers for Peace and New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
because it dealt with a different kind of causation.188 Mothers for Peace and 
New Jersey focused on the relationship between the agency action and the re-
sultant environmental impacts.189 Distinguishably, Metropolitan Edison con-
sidered the causal link between a change in the physical environment—the risk 
of subsequent accident resulting from the facility’s renewed operation—and 
the resultant effect—the increase in psychological harm or fear among local 
residents.190 Metropolitan Edison is thus distinguishable because it dealt with 
effects emanating from the risk of accident, as opposed to impacts of a realized 
risk or threat.191 Metropolitan Edison would only be applicable had the Ninth 
and Third Circuits been considering the psychological damage to residents in 
the vicinity of the nuclear facilities arising from fear of terrorist attacks.192 
Assuming No GWEN provides the appropriate framework, the inquiry 
shifts to whether the potential environmental impacts of terrorism are remote 
and highly speculative.193 Reasoned analysis suggests that such impacts are not 
too remote and highly speculative.194 
Unlike the attenuated relationship between installation of the GWEN sys-
tem and the increased possibility of nuclear war, the causal relationship be-
tween NRC facility licensing and the environmental impacts of terrorist acts is 
not too remote and highly speculative.195 The Alliance in No GWEN expressly 
conceded that its “contention that GWEN would increase the probability of 
nuclear war [was] merely speculative.”196 Circumstantial evidence demon-
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 195 See No GWEN, 855 F.2d at 1386; Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1035. 
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strates that the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is not simi-
larly speculative.197 
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Mothers for Peace, the NRC’s own “top to 
bottom” security review contradicts its stated position that the possibility of 
terrorist attacks is remote and highly speculative.198 Although the bolstering of 
security is not necessarily dispositive on its own, such efforts, in conjunction 
with other factors, ostensibly demonstrate the reasonable foreseeability of ter-
rorist attacks.199 
The 9/11 Commission Report, prepared in the wake of the World Trade 
Center attacks, found that al-Qaeda terrorists had contemplated attacking nu-
clear plants near New York City in addition to, or as an alternative to, the Twin 
Towers.200 In acknowledgement of the risk of such an attack, the NRC circu-
lated a confidential memo to all nuclear power plants in January 2002, warning 
them of terrorists’ plans to “fly a commercial aircraft into a nuclear power 
plant.”201 The U.S. government also obtained numerous computers, videos, and 
interviews connected to al-Qaeda, which made repeated references to the tar-
geting of U.S. nuclear facilities.202 
Other courts have similarly required NEPA-like consideration of terror-
ism in cases involving similarly hazardous materials.203 The NRC itself has 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030–31; infra notes 220–227 and accompanying text. 
 198 Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1030–31. “Our comprehensive review . . . has already resulted 
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 203 Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1134 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (upholding consideration of 
the risk of terrorism in shipments of chemical weapon materials); Allen v. Boston Redevelopment 
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terrorist release of contagious pathogens). 
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also suggested that it would be prudent to have new nuclear facilities consider 
the possible impacts of a large aircraft crash as part of its reactor design pro-
cess.204 The aggregation of these considerations militates against the NRC’s 
position that the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is too far 
removed from the underlying licensing action.205 
2. CEQ Regulations Require Evaluation of “Reasonably Foreseeable” 
Effects Even If Their Exact Probability Is Unknown 
In New Jersey, the Third Circuit attempted to downplay the risk of terror-
ist attacks, despite the NRC’s comprehensive security review and the findings 
of the 9/11 Commission.206 In support of its position that the NRC need not 
evaluate the environmental impacts of terrorism, the Third Circuit noted the 
NRC’s findings that the threat of terrorist attack is inherently unquantifiable, 
but nevertheless small.207 Even if the accuracy of this finding is assumed, it 
does not absolve the NRC of its obligation to account for such impacts.208 On 
the contrary, Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations expressly 
mandate consideration of effects notwithstanding the difficulty of their quanti-
fication.209 These regulations obligate agencies to evaluate reasonably foresee-
able, significant, adverse effects on the human environment.210 According to 
the CEQ, reasonable foreseeability “includes impacts which have catastrophic 
consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low.”211 The fact that 
the NRC characterizes the probability of terrorist attack as “small” therefore 
does not evidence a lack of reasonable foreseeability, nor obviate the need for 
consideration.212 
3. Analysis of the Impacts of Terrorism Is Distinguishable from a “Worst 
Case” Scenario Analysis 
The NRC argued that a compelled analysis of the environmental impacts 
of acts of terrorism is tantamount to requiring a “worse case” scenario analy-
sis—“[i]n our view, an EIS is not an appropriate format to address the chal-
lenges of terrorism. The purpose of an EIS is . . . [not] to speculate about 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Schifman, supra note 185, at 399 (referencing 72 Fed. Reg. 56,287 (Oct. 3, 2007)). 
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‘worst-case’ scenarios and how to prevent them.”213 Although it is true that 
NEPA does not require a “worst case” analysis, the NRC nevertheless mistak-
enly conflated an evaluation of the environmental effects of terrorism with a 
“worst case” scenario analysis.214 The Ninth Circuit did not demand that the 
NRC evaluate the worst conceivable or most extreme environmental effects of 
a terrorist attack, but rather, merely required it to consider the range of impacts 
likely to occur in the wake of an attack.215 Enforcement of this requirement is 
justified based on CEQ regulatory guidance requiring analysis of reasonably 
foreseeable impacts, including those with catastrophic consequences.216 Thus, 
an evaluation of the environmental impacts of terrorism is both distinguishable 
from a “worst case” analysis and administratively mandated.217 
4. NEPA Does Not Contain a Security Exemption 
The NRC argued that potential terrorist attacks are security-related issues 
that are not appropriate for public discussion in an EIS.218 The apparent con-
cern is that a detailed public disclosure of the potential environmental impacts 
of terrorist acts on nuclear facilities might threaten national security by making 
sensitive information readily available to terrorists.219 It has, however, long 
been settled by the Supreme Court that NEPA contains no such national de-
fense exception.220 Consequently, agencies must carry out NEPA’s mandate to 
the fullest extent possible, even if that necessitates discussing environmental 
impacts with national security implications.221 This position harmonizes with 
NEPA’s public disclosure goal, which seeks to ensure that information relevant 
to agency decision-making is widely available to promote public participation 
in the process.222 
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5. The False Distinction Between Licensing and Relicensing Actions 
In an attempt to distinguish its case from Mothers for Peace and justify 
the NRC’s refusal to account for terrorism, the Third Circuit found in New Jer-
sey that construction of a nuclear facility is a federal action closer in causal 
relation to a potential terrorist attack than the mere relicensing of an existing 
facility.223 This logic, however, does not necessarily follow.224 Both actions, 
regardless of scope, ultimately have the same result—facilitating the legally 
permissible operation of a nuclear facility.225 Notwithstanding the means of 
enabling operation, the end result—an operable nuclear facility—is the poten-
tial target.226 NEPA requires the NRC to analyze all reasonably foreseeable 
environmental impacts of agency action, not just the direct environmental im-
pacts of the physical act of construction.227 CEQ regulations expressly state 
that environmental impacts include indirect effects “which are caused by the 
action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reason-
ably foreseeable.”228 The environmental impacts of terrorism that are indirectly 
precipitated by the NRC’s construction or continued operation of nuclear facil-
ities would logically fall within the purview of required analysis.229 
B. Programmatic Treatment of the Environmental Effects of Terrorism 
Satisfies NEPA’s § 102(2)(C) Mandate 
1. CEQ Authorizes a Programmatic Approach to Analyzing the Environmental 
Impacts of the NRC’s Licensing Actions 
Having established that the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted NEPA as 
requiring the NRC to account for the potential environmental impacts of terror-
ism, it is necessary to determine the appropriate manner of treatment within the 
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EIS.230 The NRC treats the construction of a new nuclear facility differently 
than the relicensing of an existing facility for purposes of EIS preparation.231 
The NRC takes a programmatic approach to the relicensing of existing facili-
ties while requiring a site-specific analysis for construction of new facilities.232 
The programmatic approach to relicensing actions requires preparation of a 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) that builds upon the 
standardized GEIS that is utilized for all license renewals.233 
CEQ regulations instruct that agencies are permitted to evaluate major 
federal actions programmatically when such actions are linked geographically 
or generically.234 The NRC’s licensing and relicensing actions constitute gener-
ically linked agency actions.235 That is, these actions are comparable with re-
spect to timing (relicensing occurs every twenty years), impacts, alternatives, 
and subject matter.236 The NRC’s use of a programmatic approach is also justi-
fied by regulations expressly encouraging tiering.237 The NRC therefore need 
not engage in the superfluous and repetitive discussion of issues that will be 
common to all facilities every time it reviews an application for relicensing.238 
One such issue, common to all nuclear plants and thus ripe for programmatic 
analysis, is the potential environmental impacts of terrorism.239 
2. The NRC’s GEIS Should Explicitly Address Terrorism Rather Than 
Implicitly Grouping It Within the Scope of “Accident” 
The NRC argued in New Jersey that the existing GEIS, combined with its 
SEIS for the Oyster Creek facility, sufficiently addressed the environmental 
impacts of terrorism.240 The NRC contended that its programmatic analysis of 
Category 1 issues, more specifically “accident,” encompasses and therefore 
accounts for the possibility of terrorist attacks.241 
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The NRC’s GEIS outlines two categories of accidents, those that are “de-
sign-based” and those qualifying as “severe.”242 Terrorist attacks, however, do 
not fit neatly into either category.243 The GEIS’s treatment of externally initiat-
ed severe accidents mentions tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, fires, and sabo-
tage.244 The NRC has conducted a detailed probabilistic risk assessment for 
each of these external events with the notable exception of sabotage.245 Alt-
hough it is debatable whether a terrorist attack can accurately be considered an 
act of sabotage, technical distinctions aside, the NRC’s treatment of terrorism 
in this manner would nevertheless be inadequate.246 After downplaying the 
probability of a terrorist attack as “small” and “not reasonably expected,” the 
NRC dismissively opines that the potential damage would be no worse than 
that expected from internally initiated events.247 This vague treatment consti-
tutes the entirety of the agency’s analysis.248 
In New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(NJDEP) implicitly questioned the adequacy of the GEIS’s current treatment 
of terrorism by suggesting that the resultant environmental impacts would be 
distinguishable from those expected from internally initiated events (i.e. acci-
dents).249 At the end of its opinion, the Third Circuit hinted that the environ-
mental impacts of terrorism should require separate, express treatment.250 The 
court highlighted that the NJDEP failed to adequately explain how or why a 
terrorist attack on Oyster Creek would produce different impacts from internal-
ly initiated severe accidents.251 The court concluded that “the burden is on the 
petitioner to demonstrate that the NRC could evaluate risks more meaningfully 
than it has already done.”252 The NRC could evaluate such risks more mean-
ingfully than it has done in its existing GEIS “accident” analysis by specifical-
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ly incorporating a section discussing the potential environmental impacts of 
terrorism.253 
Thus, while the Third Circuit was correct in pointing out the Supreme 
Court’s declaration that generic analysis “is clearly an appropriate method of 
conducting the hard look required by NEPA,” that fact does not give the NRC 
a license to categorically ignore reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts 
triggered by acts of terrorism.254 To comply with NEPA’s mandate, the NRC 
should amend its existing GEIS to incorporate a direct discussion of the envi-
ronmental impacts of terrorism.255 An up-front investment in the time and re-
sources necessary to include a programmatic analysis of terrorism would likely 
pay dividends in the long run by keeping the NRC out of recurrent litigation 
similar to that in which it has recently found itself embroiled.256 
The obvious concern likely to be raised in response to this proposal is that 
programmatic treatment of terrorism in the GEIS is inappropriate given the 
inherent differences between the various facilities—geographic or other-
wise.257 This issue may not, however, be as problematic as it initially ap-
pears.258 First, any site-specific Category 2 issues—environmental impacts of 
terrorism likely to be unique to a particular facility—can be accounted for in 
the site-specific SEIS that is mandatory for all relicensing applications.259 
Those impacts requiring supplemental treatment are nevertheless likely to be 
quite rare in this context.260 
The NRC has stringent siting and design guidelines that render each nu-
clear facility geographically similar and therefore should mitigate any potential 
concern over the inability of a programmatic approach to account for site-
specific differences.261 Nuclear power plants are typically located on “flat-to-
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rolling countryside in wooded or agricultural areas.”262 Moreover, eighty per-
cent of all facilities have fifty-mile population densities of fewer than 500 per-
sons per square mile.263 These siting regulations have the effect of minimizing 
the geographic and physical differences among facility sites, making them 
more amenable to programmatic treatment.264 The NRC’s programmatic ap-
proach to analyzing the environmental impacts of nuclear facility relicensing 
therefore procedurally comports with recognized standards of proper NEPA 
analysis, but, nevertheless, needs substantive amending to address terrorism 
directly.265 
CONCLUSION 
The environmental impacts of a terrorist attack would likely be similar, if 
not worse, than those that occurred in the wake of Japan’s Fukushima melt-
down. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) must account for such ef-
fects given that the possibility of terrorist attack is not too far removed from its 
underlying licensing action. The NRC’s current approach falls short of ful-
filling the National Environmental Policy Act’s (NEPA) twin aims of “in-
ject[ing] environmental considerations into the [NRC’s] decisionmaking pro-
cess” and “inform[ing] the public that the [NRC] has considered environmen-
tal concerns in its decisionmaking process.” By amending its existing Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement to address terrorism explicitly, the NRC will 
achieve a higher degree of compliance with NEPA’s § 102(2)(C) mandate and 
further promote environmental preservation by taking into account a wider 
array of reasonably foreseeable environmental harms. 
                                                                                                                           
 262 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, supra note 75, § 2.2.1. 
 263 Id. The most notable exception is the Indian Point Station, located within fifty miles of New 
York City, which has a population density of nearly 2000 people per square mile. Id. 
 264 See 10 C.F.R. § 100.10; Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, supra note 75, § 2. 
 265 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (2012); 10 C.F.R. § 51.95(c); see supra notes 257–264 and accompa-
nying text. 
